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RICHARD POSNER: A CLASS

OF

ONE

Robert C. Farrell*
ABSTRACT
Judge Richard Posner, best known for his contributions to the field of
law and economics, has also made an outsized contribution to another area
of the law—the equal protection class-of-one claim. By some combination
of happenstance and design, Posner was able to shape the class-of-one doctrine even where his views were inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court’s initial exposition of the doctrine had identified an
equal protection violation when there was intentionally different treatment
of similarly situated persons without a rational basis for the difference in
treatment. Posner insisted that this language included within it a requirement that a defendant have acted with animus toward the plaintiff, that is, a
spiteful effort to “get” a person for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective. Was the essence of the class-of-one claim irrationality,
as advocated by the Supreme Court, or animus, as advocated by Posner?
Surprisingly, Judge Posner saw his version of the class-of-one claim become somewhat commonplace. Posner, a single judge on a United States
Court of Appeals, fought the United States Supreme Court, and, in some
large measure, held it to a draw.
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I. INTRODUCTION

J

UDGE Richard Posner, recently retired from the bench,1 is wellknown for his contributions to the field of law and economics, where
he is widely considered a leader in the field.2 He has been identified
as “the most influential American legal scholar during his almost halfcentury in the academy” and “the most cited legal scholar ‘of all time.’”3
He is a judicial “superstar,” whose opinions are cited widely outside his
circuit, and has principal cases in law school casebooks.4 It is perhaps less
well known that Posner has also made an outsized contribution to an area
of the law with which he is not so typically associated—the equal protection class of one claim. This article examines Judge Posner’s class of one
opinions and their influence. By some combination of happenstance and
design, Posner was in a position to write the opinion in a court of appeals
case5 that went on to become the Supreme Court’s first class of one case,6
and then in a position to write the opinion in the first federal court of
appeals case to interpret and apply that Supreme Court case.7 Surprisingly, he was able to adopt a framework of analysis for class of one claims
that was, at least, a questionable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and, possibly, a direct contradiction of that precedent. Even more
surprisingly, Judge Posner saw his version of the class of one claim become somewhat commonplace. Posner, a single judge on the United
States Court of Appeals, fought the U.S. Supreme Court, and, in some
large measure, held it to a draw.
This article begins with a summary and critique of the Supreme Court’s
1. Adam Lipton, An Exit Interview With Richard Posner, Judicial Provocateur, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2017, at A18.
2. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Rhetoric and Law, HARV. MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2016, at 49, 52
(“Posner did more than anyone else to promote the approach called ‘law and
economics.’”).
3. Id. at 50.
4. Margaret V. Sachs, Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: The Untold Story of Fraud
on the Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1211 (2015).
5. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998).
6. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
7. Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F. 3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000).
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two class of one cases, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,8 and Engquist v.
Oregon Department of Agriculture.9 It will then examine each of Judge
Posner’s class of one opinions, wherein he set forth his own version of the
class of one claim. Next it will evaluate the influence of Posner’s views on
other federal courts. Finally, it will evaluate the persuasiveness of Posner’s version of the class of one claim.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S CLASS OF ONE CASES
A. VILLAGE

OF

WILLOWBROOK V. OLECH

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech10 began as a minor dispute between
Grace Olech and the Village of Willowbrook over the width of an easement that the Village required from her as a condition of connecting her
home to the public water supply. According to Olech, the village demanded a thirty-three-foot easement from her, but only a fifteen-foot
easement from other Village residents.11 Olech filed suit in federal district court, claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but her
case was dismissed for failure to state a claim.12 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Posner, reversed the district court,
since Olech had met the standard established by Seventh Circuit precedent, that a plaintiff must allege “a spiteful effort to ‘get’ [a person] for
reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.”13
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case and affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit, but on completely different grounds. In a
brief per curiam opinion, the Court announced its class of one standard:
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims
brought by a “class of one,” where the plaintiff alleges that she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.14
The Court concluded that this standard had been met by the allegations
in Olech’s complaint: that the Village had demanded a larger easement
from her than from other similarly-situated village residents and that this
treatment was “irrational and wholly arbitrary.”15 Significantly, the Court
noted that the allegations in the complaint, “quite apart from the Village’s subjective motivation,” were sufficient to state a claim and that the
Court did not need to reach “the alternative theory of ‘subjective ill will’
relied on by [the Seventh Circuit].”16 Justice Breyer, concurring, noted
8. Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 562. I have written about this case previously:
Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
78 WASH. L. REV. 367 (2003). Some of the material in this section is based on that article.
9. See generally Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008).
10. Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 562.
11. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998).
12. Id. at 388.
13. Id. at 387 (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178 (7th Cir. 1995)).
14. Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.
15. Id. at 565.
16. Id.
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that the majority opinion had the potential to turn “run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right.”17 Breyer, however, citing Posner’s opinion below, suggested that the presence of vindictive action,
illegitimate animus, or ill will was sufficient to minimize that concern.18
The majority ignored Breyer’s warning.
A comparison of the Supreme Court’s Olech majority opinion and
Judge Posner’s opinion in the Seventh Circuit below reveals the basic outline of the dispute between them. For the Supreme Court, the problem
with the Village’s conduct was irrationality, that is, the Village treated
similarly-situated residents differently, without a good reason. For Posner, the problem was animus, that is, the Village treated an individual
person badly because of a bare desire to harm that person. These two
competing versions of the class of one claim are the crux of this paper.
The Court’s Olech opinion, focusing on irrationality, was curious in
three ways. First, it was conceptually unconnected with a host of existing
Supreme Court precedents. Second, the rule it adopted would create extraordinary practical problems for local government. Third, the Court deliberately ignored the important limiting principle that could have
resolved the problems its opinion created—that the class of one claim
should be limited to cases that involved vindictive action on the part of a
government official.
As to the conceptual problem and the lack of supporting precedent, the
Court insisted that “Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one.’”19 In making this assertion, the
Court purported to put the Olech case within the mainstream of equal
protection jurisprudence. This claim required an extraordinary reworking
of existing Supreme Court precedents, first, straining to identify supporting cases, and then, willfully ignoring a substantial amount of contradictory precedent. As for supporting precedents, the Court cited only two
cases, neither of which had used the term “class of one.” The first was an
obscure 1923 case that had been rarely cited by the Court,20 and the second being a more recent case that the Court had effectively limited to its
facts.21 These were the cases that were claimed to provide precedential
17. Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 564 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
20. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923). In the fifty years
immediately preceding Olech, the Supreme Court had cited Sioux City Bridge in the text of
a majority opinion only one time. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989) (citing Sioux City Bridge Co., 260 U.S. at 445–46).
21. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., 488 U.S. at 345. In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,
14–16 (1992), the petitioners argued that the result in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal required
invalidation of a very similar property tax assessment scheme in their case. The Nordlinger
Court rejected the argument, purporting to find “an obvious and critical factual difference,” and concluded that Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal “was the rare case where the facts
precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assessment practice was
to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme.” Id. at 14, 16. The Court’s
description of Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal effectively limited the case to its “rare” set of
facts.
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support for the Olech opinion.22
Additionally, the Olech Court had to ignore a substantial set of precedents that would have undermined its claim that an equal protection class
of one claim had been “recognized” by its previous cases. In almost all of
its equal protection decisions, the Court has viewed the Equal Protection
Clause as a limit on government classification, that is, a limit on the ability of government to identify a trait that puts people into a class, and then
treat that class differently from everyone else.23 Thus equal protection
cases almost always involve a claim that one group has been treated differently from a second group, and that there is no justification for the
difference in treatment.24 The Court has in fact adopted a widely used
test to review this kind of governmental action—“[u]nder traditional
equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained, if
the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.”25
This focus on equal protection as a limitation on governmental classification leaves little room for a focus on individuals who are harmed by an
appropriate classification. For example, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,26 decided the same year as Olech, the Court was concerned with
the limits of Congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
through appropriate legislation as a source of support for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In finding that Congress had exceeded
its powers, the Court stated:
22. These two cases were “as far removed from the pantheon of influential equal protection cases as one could imagine.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Farrell, supra note 8, at 394).
23. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam) (“In
this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause, for the State’s classification rationally furthers the purpose identified by the
State”); Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 6, 10 (“Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion
between classes of persons. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It
simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all
relevant respects alike.”); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 110–11 (“But this case, as equal
protection cases recurringly do, involves a legislative classification contained in a statute. . . . In an equal protection case of this type, however, those challenging the legislative
judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decision-maker.); see also Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (“Our equal
protection jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications
that affect some groups of citizens differently than others. ‘Equal protection’ . . . emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are
arguably indistinguishable. [T]he basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state
legislation whose purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes.
Plaintiffs in such cases generally allege that they have been arbitrarily classified as members of an ‘identifiable group.’”) (citations omitted).
24. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 601 (“Our equal protection jurisprudence has typically been
concerned with governmental classifications that ‘affect some groups of citizens differently
than others.’ ‘“Equal protection” . . . emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between
classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable’”) (citations omitted).
25. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
26. 528 U.S. 62, 80–90 (2000)
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Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on age as a
proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant
to the State’s legitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude reliance on such generalizations. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant.27
Thus, the constitutionality of age classifications was not to be determined
“on a person by person basis.”28 Additional Supreme Court precedents
confirm this class-based focus of the Equal Protection Clause and its lack
of concern for harm to an individual.29
It is clear then that, as long as classification meets the test of reasonableness, any harm the classification does to an individual person is an
acceptable byproduct. If it is reasonable to require the class of police officers who reach the age of fifty to retire, on the assumption that physical
fitness tends to decline with age, it is not an equal protection concern that
an individual police officer, who is over fifty but extremely fit, is forced to
retire.30 If a gender classification is substantially related to the adoption
of different rules for proving maternity and paternity in relation to acquiring citizenship, it is not an equal protection concern that an individual
child, who in fact can prove who his father is, is denied citizenship.31 If
racial classification is narrowly tailored to achieve diversity in a university
setting, it is not an equal protection concern that an individual applicant,
who might have been accepted at a university absent an affirmative action program, is denied admission.32 If the Court had taken into account
its entire body of equal protection precedents, then the idea underlying
Olech—that a primary concern of the Equal Protection Clause is the protection of individual persons—is untenable. Yet, the Court’s brief opinion
in Olech ignored all these precedents.
27. Id. at 84.
28. Id. at 85–86.
29. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 785 (1975) (“There is thus no basis for
our requiring individualized determinations when Congress can rationally conclude not
only that generalized rules are appropriate to its purposes and concerns, but also that the
difficulties of individual determinations outweigh the marginal increments in the precise
effectuation of congressional concern which they might be expected to produce.”); Parham
v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“This argument misconceives the
basic principle of the Equal Protection Clause. The function of that provision of the Constitution is to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws. Since we have
concluded that the classification created by the Georgia statute is a rational means for
dealing with the problem of proving paternity, it is constitutionally irrelevant that the appellant may be able to prove paternity in another manner.”) (citation omitted).
30. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976) (upholding age-based
discrimination under rational basis review).
31. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 70–71 (2001) (upholding gender classification
under intermediate scrutiny).
32. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (upholding race-based affirmative action program using strict scrutiny). After noting that “[t]o be narrowly tailored, a
race-conscious admissions program must not ‘unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups,’” the Court determined that “[w]e are satisfied that the Law School’s admissions program does not.” Id. at 341 (quoting Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
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The second problem with the Court’s Olech opinion is that it creates
extraordinary practical problems for local government—“the prospect of
turning every squabble over municipal services, of which there must be
tens or even hundreds of thousands every year, into a federal constitutional case.”33 These concerns were genuine. The Supreme Court’s characterization of the problem as one of irrationality—intentionally different
treatment from others similarly situated without a rational basis for the
difference in treatment—was without any limiting principle. It therefore
appeared to give every individual aggrieved by any government decision
his or her day in federal court with a constitutional claim.34 These situations subject to constitutional review would include: (1) decisions made
by local authorities in the criminal justice system—to arrest or not arrest,
to prosecute or not prosecute, to provide or not provide certain prison
conditions;35 (2) land use decisions—to approve or not approve a zoning
variance, to approve or not approve an application for a building permit,
to enforce or not enforce a building code provision;36 (3) employment
decisions—to hire or not hire, to promote or not promote, to raise an
employee’s salary or not raise it, to impose discipline or not impose it, to
terminate an employee or not terminate;37 (4) government contracts—to
enter or not enter into a contract with a particular party for trash removal, towing, office supplies, or any other product or service needed by
a local government;38 (5) regulation of business—to issue or not issue a
license, to renew or not renew a license;39 (6) education—to suspend or
not suspend a student, to expel or not expel a student, to impose or not
impose disciplinary action on a student;40 and (7) government benefits—
to grant or not grant housing subsidies, to grant or not grant monetary

33. Olech v. Vill. Of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).
34. This is not to say that these plaintiffs would all have a winning constitutional claim,
but they could easily frame one in a complaint that would require the government to defend the case. Had the lower courts not adopted limiting principles to the Supreme Court’s
Olech opinion, many of these claims might have been successful.
35. E.g., King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that prisoner’s
complaint of his treatment by prison authorities stated a class of one equal protection
claim).
36. E.g., Contasti v. City of Solana Beach, 644 F. App’x 743, 745 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that plaintiff had stated a viable class of one claim in the land use context regarding the
city’s treatment of her application for a development permit).
37. See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 596–98 (2008) (noting, but
then reversing, a successful class of one claim by a government employee who had won a
jury verdict of $175,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages).
38. E.g., Renato Pistolesi, Alltow, Inc. v. Calabrese, 666 F. App’x 55, 58 (2d Cir. 2016)
(summary order) (considering but rejecting towing company’s class of one claim in that it
had been passed over in favor of other towing companies).
39. E.g., Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178–80 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiff
stated a class of one claim when city refused to renew his liquor license for spiteful
reasons).
40. E.g., Crowley v. McKinney, 400 F.3d 965, 972 (7th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff had stated
class of one claim in alleging that the school had denied him access to school records and
school premises out of vindictiveness).
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benefits.41 By opening the door to all of these claims, the Olech Court
created a situation where many instances of everyday governing at the
local level could now be considered constitutional violations.
The third problem with the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion was that
the Court ignored the important limiting principle suggested by Judge
Posner. For Posner, class of one cases made sense only where the challenged governmental act was based on vindictiveness or ill will.42 Had this
“ill will” limitation attached to the class of one claim, the tens or hundreds of thousands of cases where government treated people differently
without a rational reason, without more, would no longer state a viable
class of one claim. There was ample support for this animus limitation
within existing Supreme Court precedents, if the Court had been willing
to look for it.
One clear precedent on point was Snowden v. Hughes,43 a Supreme
Court case in which the plaintiff alleged that certain officials had violated
state law in not certifying him for nomination to the state assembly and,
in so doing, had violated his equal protection rights. The Court rejected
the claim, explaining that “an erroneous or mistaken performance of the
statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a
denial of the equal protection of the laws.”44 And what is the something
more that the Court was looking for? The Court explained: “[t]he unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike,
is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it
an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”45 This was precisely the kind of limitation that the Court might have applied in Olech,
but failed to do so.
There are additional Supreme Court precedents in the area of selective
prosecution or selective enforcement that also support the “purposeful
discrimination” limitation in the closely related class of one claims. Selective prosecution and selective enforcement claims predate the Court’s
class of one precedents, but they make basically the same claim—that the
plaintiff has been singled out by government prosecutors or enforcement
agents while others, in similar circumstances, have been allowed to go
free. These claims are very hard to win because they call into question the
basic discretionary power that has been assigned to the executive branch
to enforce the law.46 In the few cases where plaintiffs prevailed, the Court
41. E.g., Garanin v. New York City Hous. Pres. & Dev., 673 F. App’x 122, 124 (2d Cir.
2016) (summary order) (considering but rejecting plaintiff’s class of one claim where his
application for middle income housing had been denied).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 68–81, 87–96.
43. 321 U.S. 1, 2–5 (1944), reh’g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1994).
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“A selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial power over a ‘special province’ of the Executive. The Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain ‘“broad discretion”’ to
enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.”) (citations omitted).
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has focused on improper purpose.
In United States v. Armstrong,47 the plaintiff complained of his selective
prosecution on the basis of race. The Court rejected that claim, stating
that “[t]he requirements for a selective-prosecution claim draw on ‘ordinary equal protection standards,’” and that “[t]he claimant must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy ‘had a discriminatory effect
and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.’”48 Furthermore,
in Wayte v. United States,49 the Supreme Court considered the question of
whether a “passive enforcement policy under which the Government
prosecutes only those who report themselves as having violated the law,
or who are reported by others”50 violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court answered no, since “[i]t is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards. Under
[the Court’s] prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both
that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that
it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”51 Surely there was ample
support in Supreme Court precedents for the Olech Court to have required animus as an essential element of the class of one claim.
With regard to more general equal protection doctrine outside of the
class of one area, there is also a substantial set of precedents that government action violates equal protection if it is based on an improper motive.
The Olech Court ignored these precedents as well. They will be examined
carefully in Part IV of this article.
B. ENGQUIST V. OREGON DEPARTMENT

OF

AGRICULTURE 52

In the years following Olech, the lower federal courts were stuck with a
Supreme Court opinion that was, on the one hand, binding on them, but
was on the other hand, unworkable.53 Olech simply opened up too many
avenues to bring a constitutional claim in federal courts. The lower courts
responded by interpreting Olech to limit its reach as much as possible.
They accomplished this by: (1) imposing the improper motivation test;54
47. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
48. Id. at 465 (citations omitted).
49. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
50. Id. at 600.
51. Id. at 608 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
52. 553 U.S. 591 (2008). I have written about this case previously: Robert C. Farrell,
The Equal Protection Class of One Claim: Olech, Engquist, and the Supreme Court’s
Misadventure, 61 S.C. L. REV. 107 (2009). Some of the material in this section is based on
that article.
53. See, e.g., Jennings v. Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2004) (“In the
wake of Olech, the lower courts have struggled to define the contours of class of one cases.
All have recognized that, unless carefully circumscribed, the concept of a class of one equal
protection claim could effectively provide a federal cause of action for review of almost
every executive and administrative decision made by state actors.”).
54. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 68–81, 87–96.
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(2) imposing a strict intent standard;55 (3) imposing a restrictive interpretation of similarly situated;56 or (4) requiring a plaintiff to negate all conceivable justifications for a government’s action.57 Eight years later, the
Supreme Court decided its second class of one claim, Engquist v. Oregon
Department of Agriculture.
In Engquist, a state employee had won her class of one claim in the
district court, which found that the denial of a promotion and her subsequent termination were without rational basis, and that these actions had
been taken solely for vindictive or malicious reasons.58 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, on the ground that the class of one
claim did not apply to employment decisions by governments.59 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit. The Court’s narrow holding was
that government employment was excepted from the class of one doctrine.60 But the more significant portion of the opinion involved its explanation of that decision—that employment decisions commonly involve
the exercise of discretion and that, where state action involves discretionary decision-making “based on a vast array of subjective, individualized
assessments,” the rule that like should be treated alike cannot be reasonably applied since “treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted.”61
The Court’s Engquist opinion is an implicit acknowledgment that the
Olech opinion is flawed. Olech had opened a vast new array of constitutional claims that needed to be limited, and the Engquist Court did impose a limit on those claims. Unfortunately, the Court chose an
inappropriate and ineffective limit. The Court chose to except one particular factual setting—government employment—from the class of one
doctrine, but did not address the more basic problems with the doctrine.
And lower courts did not view the precedential effect of Engquist as limited to government employment decisions. Rather, lower federal courts
treated Engquist as covering a host of other non-employment discretion55. E.g., Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 751 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that
government defendants could not have intended to treat plaintiff differently from a similarly situated person if they don’t know about the other person).
56. E.g., Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We have held
that class of one plaintiffs must show an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves. . . . Accordingly, to succeed on a
class of one claim, a plaintiff must establish that (i) no rational person could regard the
circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would
justify the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the
similarity in circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted on the basis of a mistake.”) (citations omitted).
57. E.g., Scherr v. City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 2014) (insisting “that a
class-of-one plaintiff ‘must, to prevail, negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’”).
58. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 596 (2008).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 607 (“In concluding that the class of one theory of equal protection has no
application in the public employment context—and that is all we decide—we are guided, as
in the past, by the ‘common-sense realization that government offices could not function if
every employment decision became a constitutional matter.’”).
61. Id. at 603.
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ary decisions, including government action that involved criminal justice,62 land use planning,63 education,64 and government contracting.65
The Second and Seventh Circuits, however, did eventually impose some
limit on this extension of Engquist, indicating that the Engquist precedent
did not extend to all kinds of discretionary decisions.66
Most importantly, for purposes of this article, the Court never even
considered correcting the class of one problem by imposing the ill will
standard that Justice Posner had suggested. This was surprising, considering that the trial court in Engquist found that the plaintiff had been terminated for vindictive or malicious reasons.67 The Court had just rejected
the plaintiff’s claim against her government employer because the decision to terminate her was embedded in a thick mess of discretionary matters. But the plaintiff had proven that the government had exercised its
discretion in bad faith to inflict harm on her intentionally. Shouldn’t that
animus have outweighed any discretionary exception? The Court did not
even treat this question as worthy of consideration.
III. JUDGE POSNER’S CLASS OF ONE OPINIONS
The battle lines were drawn. Was the core of the class of one claim
irrationality, as held by the Supreme Court, or was it animus, as held by
Judge Posner? Judge Posner, as a sitting judge on the Seventh Circuit, was
in a unique position to shape the class of one claim, both before it
reached the Supreme Court, and then afterward. Posner wrote eleven
class of one opinions, either for the majority or concurring. This section
will examine each of those opinions, in chronological order.
A. ESMAIL V. MACRANE
In Esmail v. Macrane,68 Posner wrote his first class of one opinion, an
opinion that predated the Supreme Court’s first entry into the subject by
five years. In Esmail, the plaintiff operated a retail liquor store and was
required to renew its license annually.69 The mayor, who was also the
liquor control commissioner, denied his application for renewal.70 Esmail
alleged that the reason for the denial was that city officials had a “deepseated animosity” toward him that was part of the mayor’s “campaign of
62. E.g., United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 2008).
63. E.g., Nasca v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 05-CV-122 (JFB)(ETB), 2008 WL
4426906, at *1, *10–14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 475 (2d Cir. 2009).
64. E.g., Vassallo v. Lando, 591 F. Supp. 2d 172, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
65. E.g., Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).
66. See Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that Engquist does
not support the argument that malicious police conduct, even though discretionary, is offlimits from class of one claims); Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142
(2d Cir. 2010) (“We join the Seventh Circuit in holding that Engquist does not bar all class
of one claims involving discretionary state action.”).
67. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 596 (2008).
68. 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
69. Id. at 177.
70. Id.
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vengeance” against him.71 The trial judge dismissed the case for failure to
state a claim.72 On appeal, Judge Posner wrote the opinion that reversed
the district court.
Posner conceded that Esmail’s complaint was “an unusual kind of
equal protection case,” in that it involved neither the unequal treatment
of a vulnerable group nor a challenge to “laws or policies alleged to make
irrational distinctions.”73 But “neither in terms nor in interpretation is the
[Equal Protection Clause] limited to protecting identifiable groups.”74
Esmail’s claim was about an administrative decision by local government
officials that adversely affected him alone. Posner determined that he had
stated a claim.75
Posner distinguished Esmail’s claim from the common situations where
government officials fail to enforce laws fully, either as a result of random
selection or by concentrating on the most newsworthy lawbreakers.76 The
result in such cases is that “people who are equally guilty of crimes or
other violations receive unequal treatment, with some being punished
and others getting off scot-free.”77 But such an outcome would be the
inevitable result of the inability of any government to enforce all its laws
to the fullest extent. Esmail, however, was not complaining about a random or purposive enforcement of a law. He was complaining about “an
orchestrated campaign of official harassment directed at him out of sheer
malice,”78 and for that, Posner said, he “ought to have a remedy in federal court.”79 Posner provided support for his conclusion by citing City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,80 a case in which the Supreme Court
had invalidated application of an ordinance that purposely disadvantaged
the intellectually disabled. That challenged action had been determined
to be unconstitutional because the government action was designed to
achieve an illegitimate end.81
Esmail, the first of Posner’s class of one opinions, is significant for establishing Posner’s baseline understanding of class of one claims: that the
different treatment of similarly situated persons is inevitable in the day to
day operation of government and, therefore, unexceptional as a constitutional issue. What mattered were actions taken with an improper, vindictive motivation.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
rest on

Id. at 178.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 450 (“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to
an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”).
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INDIANA STATE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION V.
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS

In Indiana State Teachers Association v. Board of School Commissioners,82 there was a dispute between a labor union and the Indianapolis
School Board, which had chosen a different union to represent nonteacher employees.83 This was not a case where the government was
treating one person differently from another similarly situated person, but
rather it was a case where the government was treating one organization
(a union) differently from a second organization (a second union). Posner, however, was willing to treat the class of one precedents as possibly
relevant, but then determined that the plaintiff could not prevail—its
claim would prove too much:
The concept of equal protection is trivialized when it is used to subject every decision made by state or local government to constitutional review by federal courts. To decide is to choose, and ordinarily
to choose between—to choose one suppliant, applicant, petitioner,
protester, contractor, or employee over another. Can the loser in the
contest automatically appeal to the federal courts on the ground that
the decision was arbitrary and an arbitrary decision treats likes as
unlike and therefore denies the equal protection of the laws? That
would constitutionalize the Administrative Procedure Act and make
its provisions binding on state and local government and enforceable
in the federal courts.84
Consistent with his earlier opinion in Esmail, Posner explained that even
where government is treating similarly situated persons differently, the
equal protection clause is brought into play only “as a protection against
allowing the government to single out a hapless individual, firm, or other
entity for unfavorable treatment.”85 There was none of that improper
motivation on the part of the school board. It was not irrational for the
school to prefer the union that it had been working with for a long time
over a completely unfamiliar union.86 The class of one claim failed.
Here again, Posner made clear that it was not arbitrary (and thus irrational) conduct that was the basis of a class of one claim, but only government action based on an impermissible motive.
C.

OLECH V. VILLAGE
87

OF

WILLOWBROOK

Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, which was to become the Supreme
Court’s first class of one case, started in the Seventh Circuit, and Posner
wrote the opinion for the majority in the case. The trial judge had dismissed the case,88 and Posner reversed on the ground that the trial judge
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

101 F.3d 1179 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1181–82.
Id. at 1182.
160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 388.
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had construed his earlier Esmail opinion too strictly, requiring an
“orchestrated campaign of official harassment.”89 Posner made clear
there was no necessity of orchestration as long as “ill will is the sole cause
of the action of which the plaintiff complains.”90 Posner conceded that in
Esmail the plaintiff may have been denied a liquor license while others
similarly situated received a license, but “[s]tanding by itself, this difference in treatment would not have been a denial of equal protection, but
merely an example of uneven law enforcement, than which nothing is
more common nor, in the usual case, constitutionally innocent.”91
What was important in Olech was not uneven enforcement of the law,
but a refusal to provide governmental service because of a “baseless hatred”92 toward Olech. Olech had alleged in her complaint that the reason
the Village had treated her worse than her neighbors was that she had
previously won a lawsuit against the Village, and that successful suit generated substantial ill will toward her from Village officials.93 For Posner,
this allegation was sufficient to state a class of one claim.
And what about “the prospect of turning every squabble over municipal services, of which there must be tens or even hundreds of thousands
every year, into a federal constitutional case[ ]”?94 That might certainly
be a problem, but Posner suggested that that concern was adequately addressed by the “vindictive action” element of his class of one formula,
which “requires proof that the cause of the differential treatment of
which the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate animus toward the
plaintiff by the defendant.”95 This requirement would be a substantial
limitation on the number of successful class of one claims. And even if
there is some evidence of animus, the government action would not be
condemned “[i]f the defendant would have taken the complained-of action anyway.”96
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s Olech decision, but on an entirely different ground, quite
apart from the “subjective motivation” or “subjective ill will” theories
relied upon by Judge Posner. That opinion was discussed in Section I.A.
D. HILTON V. CITY

OF

WHEELING

97

Hilton v. City of Wheeling was the first Court of Appeals case to interpret and apply the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion, being published
less than two months after the Supreme Court opinion.98 It was probably
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 387.
94. Id. at 388.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000).
98. The Supreme Court’s Olech opinion was published on February 23, 2000. See generally Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam). The Seventh Cir-
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Posner’s most important class of one opinion, since he was the first out of
the gate, and thus in a position to frame his class of one analysis as consistent with the Supreme Court precedent. As a matter of court hierarchy,
Posner should have been obligated to follow the Supreme Court. His
Hilton opinion, however largely ignored the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion and restated his own views as he had previously expressed in Esmail,
Indiana State Teachers, and Olech.
Hilton had been involved in a longtime feud with his neighbors and he
complained of unequal police protection, claiming that the police had responded to his neighbors’ complaints about him but not to his complaints
about his neighbors.99 As Posner viewed the facts, Hilton had made no
attempt to discover why he had been treated differently from his
neighbors:
For reasons that Hilton has not attempted to discover, the police exercised the broad discretion that custom gives them in enforcing minor public nuisance laws, in favor of the neighbors. For all we know,
they did so simply because the neighbors were always in the right
and Hilton always in the wrong. But maybe not; maybe the Wheeling
police are inept, or have been deceived by the neighbors. It doesn’t
matter; what matters is the absence of evidence of an improper
motive.100
But what about the Supreme Court’s opinion which had stated that its
decision was not based on improper motive? Posner insisted that “[t]he
role of motive is left unclear by the Supreme Court’s decision”101—for if
motive were actually irrelevant, then “federal courts would be drawn
deep into the local enforcement of petty state and local laws.”102 For Posner, this could not be, and there had to be a way out of the dilemma. For
Posner, there was:
[W]e gloss ‘no rational basis’ in the unusual setting of ‘class of one’
equal protection cases to mean that to make out a prima facie case
the plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant deliberately
sought to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws for reasons
of a personal nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant’s
position.103
Posner then cited his own Seventh Circuit Olech opinion to demonstrate
that “totally illegitimate animus” is a required element of a class of one
claim.104 By citing his own opinion, Posner implied that it had survived
the Supreme Court’s opinion that had almost certainly suggested othercuit’s Hilton opinion was published on April 20, 2000. See generally Hilton, 209 F.3d at
1005.
99. Id. at 1006.
100. Id. at 1007–08 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 1008.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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wise. Since the plaintiff in Hilton had presented no evidence of animus,
he lost.
Posner’s Hilton opinion certainly could be described as brave. While he
purported to be giving effect to the Supreme Court opinion, his own
opinion was surely at odds with it. To be sure, Posner’s opinion presented
a far more realistic understanding of how local governments work, and it
was the far more sensible recognition of the breathtaking vistas of liability that the Supreme Court’s opinion would open up. But it also raised a
new question: Does the Seventh Circuit have to follow the Supreme
Court?
E. BELL V. DUPERRAULT
Four years after Hilton, the Seventh Circuit decided Bell v. Duperrault.105 Bell was a case in which a landowner wanted to build a pier into
the water but was denied a building permit since he was unwilling to go
through an administrative hearing.106 Bell claimed that other similarly situated landowners had been granted permits without a hearing, and that
this different treatment constituted a denial of equal protection.107 Judge
Flaum, writing the majority opinion for the three-judge panel, rejected
that claim. Flaum initially focused on the absence of similarly situated
homeowners as precluding Bell’s claim, but he later also considered and
rejected Bell’s claim that the permit denial was the result of discriminatory animus toward him.108 Flaum’s opinion thus implied that one could
prevail on a class of one claim either by showing different treatment of
similarly situated persons or by showing animus.
Judge Posner wrote a separate concurring opinion. He indicated that he
was writing “in an effort to clarify the standard (on which the majority
opinion is prudently noncommittal) applicable to ‘class of one’ equal protection cases.”109 Posner noted that in the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurrence had approved the Seventh Circuit’s
formulation of the class of one claim (requiring animus), but that
Breyer’s colleagues had not responded.110 Posner then stated: “Their silence requires interpretation.”111
First, Posner argued that his Hilton opinion was consistent with the Supreme Court’s language in Olech—“irrational and wholly arbitrary.” He
suggested that the Supreme Court in Olech spoke only to what a plaintiff
need allege (“‘irrational and wholly arbitrary’ treatment”), but did not
make clear what a plaintiff must prove.112 Since the phrase “irrational
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

367 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 707–09.
Id. at 709 (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 710.
Id.
See id. at 711 (citation omitted).
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and wholly arbitrary” treatment was not self-defining,113 Posner was of
the view that Olech left open the door for interpretation, and that his own
resolution of that issue in Hilton opinion was not foreclosed. But Posner
was forced into an admission of sorts. Having noted that the Olech majority had found the allegations that the defendant was acting in an irrational and wholly arbitrary manner were sufficient “quite apart from the
[defendant’s] subjective motivation,”114 Posner conceded:
And so the cases on which I am relying may be fighting a doomed
rearguard action. May the Court enlighten us; the fact that the postOlech cases are all over the map suggests a need for the Court to
step in and clarify its ‘cryptic’ per curiam decision.115
Of course, the Supreme Court has never further enlightened us about the
meaning of its cryptic opinion, and Posner’s rearguard action was not in
fact doomed.
The heart of Posner’s critique of the Olech rule is that different treatment of similarly situated persons is inevitable at the lowest operational
level of government, and thus should not give rise to a constitutional
claim unless invidiously motivated. When the police pull over one car
traveling at sixty-five miles per hour but not another, when one asylum
officer turns down an applicant while a second asylum officer grants the
application in a similar case, when the IRS audits one taxpayer’s return
but does not audit another similarly-situated taxpayer—why should these
cases, multiplied by tens or hundreds of thousands, create an equal protection violation, absent improper motivation?
Posner explained the reason that motive is an important limit on the
Olech standard:
[R]equiring proof of a bad motive brings the class of one cases into
harmony with the standard equal protection cases and the purpose
behind the equal protection clause. That purpose is to protect the
vulnerable . . . . These [cited cases] are all cases in which the unequal
treatment complained of is either vicious or exploitative (or frequently both), and the fundamental insight of the class of one cases is
that vicious or exploitative discrimination can sometimes be found
even when the victim does not belong to a group that is a familiar
target of such treatment. Indeed, a lone victim picked out for social
or economic oppression or extinction can be especially vulnerable.116
Posner noted that standards relying on motive are problematic, since
“‘[m]otive’ tests are not very satisfactory and are therefore sparingly employed in the law. Motives are difficult to discern and often they are irrelevant to the social interests in a case.”117 But having conceded that point,
Posner insisted:
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
at 711–12 (citation omitted).
at 712 (citations omitted).
at 713.
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I haven’t been able to think of a better way of reining in the class of
one cases, which have an ominous potential to burst the proper
bounds of equal protection law, than to insist that an improper motive by a government official have been the sole cause of the inequality of treatment of which the plaintiff is complaining.118
Judge Posner’s concurrence in Bell is perhaps his most full-throated
defense of the vindictive-motive limitation on class of one claims. It purported to explain how the motive limitation is a plausible interpretation
of the Supreme Court’s “irrational and wholly arbitrary” standard, and it
sought to show the connection between bad motives and the most basic
purpose underlying the equal protection clause.
F.

INDIANA LAND CO. V. CITY

OF

GREENWOOD

119

In Indiana Land Co. v. City of Greenwood,
a real estate developer
applied for approval of an annexation of certain property and a rezoning
of it. The proposal initially was rejected by the City’s Plan Commission,
but then received majority approval by the City Council of Greenwood.120 The proposal failed, however, because it did not satisfy a local
rule that such a vote, overturning the recommendation of the Plan Commission, required approval of two-thirds of those voting.121 The City subsequently amended its two-thirds rule and required only a majority to
overrule its Plan Commission, but did not apply this amended rule retroactively to the developer’s application.122 He filed suit claiming, inter alia,
that the failure to apply the new majority vote rule to his application was
a violation of equal protection.123
Judge Posner, writing for the majority, found no violation of equal protection. Citing his own opinion in Hilton, he noted that Hilton required a
plaintiff to present evidence that “the defendant deliberately sought to
deprive him of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal
nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant’s position.”124 Posner
found that the plaintiff did not satisfy this standard, as the mere failure to
apply the new majority standard to plaintiff’s case was insufficient to
show “ill will or exploitative or otherwise illegitimate motives.”125 Just to
cover his bases, Posner noted that other panels within the Seventh Circuit
had adopted a different Olech standard—a “showing that the defendant
had intentionally treated the plaintiff differently from others similarly situated and had had no rational basis for doing so.”126 Conceding that
there was a tension between this standard and the standard that he had
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
2000)).
125.
126.

Id.
378 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 707.
Id. at 707–08.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 712 (quoting Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d. 1005, 1008 (7th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 713.
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set forth in Hilton, Posner determined that there was no need to resolve
the conflict since the city’s action satisfied the other standard as well: it
was rational not to apply rules retroactively.127
Posner’s opinion in Indiana Land broke no new ground, but it evidenced his continued commitment to the vindictive motivation class of
one standard, as well as his awareness that not all of his Seventh Circuit
colleagues agreed with him.
G.

TUFFENDSAM V. DEARBORN COUNTY BOARD

OF

HEALTH

For Posner, 2004 was a busy class of one year, in that Tuffendsam v.
Dearborn County Board of Health128 was his third class of one opinion of
the year. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the county health board
was enforcing its sewage discharge rules more zealously against her than
against her neighbors.129 Posner once again began his analysis by citing
Olech’s “irrational and wholly arbitrary” language and warned of the
“[b]reathtaking vistas of liability” that would be opened up by an unconstrained interpretation of that language.130 Thus, he explained, his opinion in Hilton limited those vistas by requiring a deliberate act by the
defendant seeking to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection “for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the defendant’s position.”131 Since
there was no evidence of such ill will presented, that would resolve the
case against the plaintiff.132
But, once again, as in Indiana Land, Posner seemed to feel it necessary
to give some mention to the alternative Seventh Circuit interpretation of
Olech, one that required a simple showing that “the defendant had intentionally treated the plaintiff differently from others similarly situated and
had had no rational basis for doing so.”133 This time, Posner tried a different tack, suggesting that “[the] divergent strands in the case law [could],
however, be woven together.”134 The attempted reconciliation of the two
views was based on the ambiguity of the word “intentionally.” That word,
Posner indicated, could at one extreme mean “mere knowledge of likely
consequences” or at the other extreme, “a desire for those consequences.”135 Posner said that, in the class of one context, “intentionally”
different treatment should have the second meaning.136 Thus, in Tuffendsam, the health board “intentionally” treated the plaintiff differently in
that it had to know that its pattern of septic tank enforcement was une127. Id.
128. 385 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2004).
129. Id. at 1127.
130. Id. (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam)).
131. Id. (quoting Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000)) (subsequent citations omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2004)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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ven.137 “But [the board] did not ‘intentionally’ treat the plaintiff worse in
the sense of wanting her to be worse off than those others.”138 By this
linguistic legerdemain, Posner appeared to harmonize his Hilton opinion
with the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion—“intentionally different treatment” was interpreted to mean “purposefully worse treatment.” This attempt to weave the two strands together was not entirely persuasive. In
Olech, the Supreme Court had stated both that: (1) a class of one plaintiff
had to prove “intentionally” different treatment, and that (2) such an allegation, “quite apart from the Village’s subjective motivation” were sufficient. This suggests that “intentionally” is not equivalent to wanting
someone to be worse off than others. So this attempt at reconciliation of
opposing views does not really work. Rather, it seems to show that Posner was still unwilling to admit that he was hemmed in by the Supreme
Court’s Olech opinion.
H. CROWLEY V. MCKINNEY
In Crowley v. McKinney,139 the plaintiff was the father of a student
attending public school. He alleged that the school principal was denying
him access to school records and school premises because of the principal’s animosity toward him, arising from the father’s criticism of the
school and its management.140 Importantly, Posner described this alleged
animosity as “the pivot on which Crowley’s [class of one] equal protection
claim turn[ed].”141 As in previous cases, Posner noted that the Seventh
Circuit had recognized two standards for proving class of one violations—
the “personal animosity” standard from Hilton, and the “intentionally
different treatment of those similarly situated standard” from other Seventh Circuit precedents.142 Posner cited his opinion in Tuffendsam to
show that the ambiguous concept of intentionality could be used to weave
the two divergent strands together.143
With this blurring of the strands, Posner concluded that the plaintiff
had alleged an equal protection violation under either test.144 Or, more
accurately, alleged a prima facie violation, for “animus is not a sufficient
condition for a class of one claim to succeed.”145 Thus, if the defendant
“would have acted the same way toward [the plaintiff] had he not disliked
him . . . then the concurrence of an improper motive would not condemn
the act.”146 Therefore, the plaintiff’s case ought not to have been dismissed on the pleadings, for his claim was adequately pleaded.
137. Id.
138. Id. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per curiam).
139. 400 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2005).
140. Id. at 972.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Tuffendsam v. Dearborn Cty. Bd. of Health, 385 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th
Cir. 2004)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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I. LAUTH V. MCCOLLUM
In Lauth v. McCollum,147 the plaintiff was a police officer who had
been suspended for failure to follow standard operating procedures and
statutory requirements during the investigation of a missing child.148 The
plaintiff claimed that his suspension was the result of animosity toward
him by the police chief and the Village Board of Police Commissioners
because he had been instrumental in getting the Village police force unionized.149 This case predated the Supreme Court’s Engquist decision by
three years, so Posner could not dismiss the case on the ground that it
involved government employment. Still, Posner was not sympathetic, and
noted that “[t]here [wa]s clearly something wrong with a suit of this character coming into federal court dressed as a constitutional case.”150 Posner explained the problem as follows:
These are cases in which the plaintiff does not claim to be a member
of a class that the defendant discriminates against, but argues only
that he is being treated arbitrarily worse than someone or ones identically situated to him. If that is the law and any unexplained or unjustified disparity in treatment by public officials is therefore to be
deemed a prima facie denial of equal protection, endless vistas of
federal liability are opened. Complete equality in enforcement is impossible to achieve; nor can personal motives be purged from all official action, especially in the frequently tense setting of labor
relations.151
In contrast to these endless vistas of liability based on a mere showing of
arbitrariness, Posner suggested that the “paradigmatic” class of one claim
was one in which “a public official, with no conceivable basis for his action other than spite or some other improper motive . . . comes down
hard on a hapless private citizen.”152
Posner noted that courts were “still struggling to circumscribe this
amorphous cause of action.”153 He then went on to identify a second way
to reconcile the Seventh Circuit’s two lines of cases. While he had previously focused on the ambiguous meaning of the word “intentionally,”154
in Lauth he focused on the deferential version of the equal protection
rational basis standard, which required a plaintiff to “negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification.”155 This is a standard that, if literally applied, is impossible to meet. The Supreme Court has quite clearly not applied it consist147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

424 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 631–32.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 634.
See supra text accompanying notes 133–138.
Lauth, 424 F.3d at 634.
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ently in rational basis cases.156 But for Posner, this standard would
demonstrate that the irrationality and animus tests are not irreconcilable:
“Animus thus comes into play only when, no rational reason or motive
being imaginable for the injurious action taken by the defendant against
the plaintiff, the action would be inexplicable unless animus had motivated it.”157 It should be noted that this requirement that a plaintiff negative all conceivable justifications for the defendant’s conduct does not
appear in Posner’s early class of one cases. In Olech, for example, Posner
explained that “the ‘vindictive action’ class of equal protection cases [simply] requires proof that the cause of the differential treatment of which
the plaintiff complains was a totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.”158 Posner’s newer version of the test would make it
far harder for class of one plaintiffs to prevail, even where they suffered
precisely because of the illegitimate animus of the defendant, since those
plaintiffs might not be able to negative all conceivable justifications for
the defendant’s conduct.
The plaintiff in Lauth had alleged animus on the part of the police chief
as the reason for his suspension, but he had clearly not negated any conceivable state of facts that would explain his treatment. Thus, Posner affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant.
Posner made no mention of the fact that his newest standard, requiring
the plaintiff to negative any conceivable state of facts before animus
comes into play, was a more demanding standard than the one he had
announced in Hilton. If it was taken literally, plaintiffs would never meet
this impossible burden and the animus-based class of one claim would be
doomed. But Posner did not consistently adhere to this more demanding
standard, as can be seen in the next case.
J. DEL MARCELLE V. BROWN COUNTY CORP.
Del Marcelle v. Brown County Corp.159 was supposed to be a high
stakes summit at which all the judges of the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, would finally resolve the intra-circuit conflict on the essential elements of the class of one claim. The summit failed. The en banc opinion,
in fact, turned out to be a muddle, with no majority opinion and three
competing versions of the class of one claim. In failing to resolve the conflicts, the court instead shone a bright light on the disagreements between
judges in the Seventh Circuit and the inability of those judges to bridge
the gap that separated them.
The Del Marcelle case had been brought in the district court by a plaintiff who alleged that the police had failed to respond to his complaint
156. See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from
the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 415 (1999).
157. Lauth, 424 F.3d at 634.
158. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).
159. 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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about gangs that were harassing him and his wife.160 The district court
dismissed the complaint.161 An appeal was initially taken to a three-judge
panel, which prepared a draft opinion and circulated it to the full court.162
The full court decided to hear the case en banc, “hop[ing] that the judges
might be able to agree on an improved standard” for class of one cases.163
The judges were not able to agree. The en banc court produced three
opinions, none commanding a majority of judges. Posner wrote the lead
opinion, affirming the district court’s dismissal, but was joined by only
three judges.164 Judge Easterbrook concurred in the judgment, but not in
Posner’s opinion, thus providing a fifth vote for affirmance.165 Five judges
dissented and would have reversed the district court.166 Since reversal
requires a majority, the five to five vote left the district court opinion in
place.167
Posner’s opinion is a lengthy exposition of the class of one problem.
Looking back at the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion, he noted that, although the Court used the term “irrational and wholly arbitrary” to describe the prohibited conduct, it left those “key words . . . undefined.”168
Posner also focused on Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, which would
have required “subjective ill will” as an element of a class of one claim as
a means of cabining the unlimited vistas of liability, had “[t]he majority
[not] ignored his concurrence.”169 Posner thought this was a mistake—
“[w]e have difficulty understanding why.”170 Had the Court made ill will
a factor in class of one claims, then it would have “launched modern class
of one claim equal protection litigation on calmer waters.”171
Posner then candidly admitted that lower-court judges could not accept
the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion at face value.172 For Posner, the problem had always been that when local government officials are making
thousands of decisions on a daily basis, the effect of these decisions is that
some persons are benefited and some are harmed. In this situation, it is
inevitable that similarly-situated persons will be treated differently. For
Posner, “[t]he challenge is to find amidst the welter of trivial ‘irrationalities’ in discretionary actions by frontline public employees acts of discrimination of a character to warrant classification as denials of equal
160. Id. at 888 (Posner, J.).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 888–89.
163. Id. at 889.
164. Id. at 888.
165. Id. at 900 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 905 (Wood, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 889 (Posner, J.) (noting that the result of an appellate court’s tie vote is
affirmance).
168. Id. at 890 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (per
curiam)).
169. Id. at 891 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (“[L]ike Justice Breyer, lower-court judges did not believe that class of one
litigation could be kept from exploding without some limiting principles, but they (we)
couldn’t and still can’t agree on what those principles should be.”).
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protection.”173 The fact that some government decisions are random does
not make them irrational. “Randomization can be a proper and indeed
indispensable tool of government, given limited governmental resources.”174 In these situations, “[m]ore is needed” in order to make out a
constitutional claim .175 And for Posner, “the more should relate to the
public officer’s motivations, subjective though they are.”176 “The plaintiff
must plead and prove both the absence of a rational basis for the defendant’s action and some improper personal motive (which need not be
hostility, but could be, for example, corruption) for the differential
treatment.”177
Thus, Posner’s opinion makes quite clear that, because of the openended government liability under the Supreme Court’s Olech standard, a
limiting principle is required. That limiting principle is the presence of
improper motivation. Only three of ten judges on the Seventh Circuit
joined Posner. Judge Easterbrook, writing for himself, insisted that, in
class of one suits, “motive or intent . . . has no role at all.”178
Judge Wood, joined by four judges, was of the view that the plaintiff in
a class of one claim would have to prove the following elements: “(1)
plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination, (2) at the hands of a
state actor, (3) the state actor lacked a rational basis for so singling out
the plaintiff, and (4) the plaintiff has been injured by the intentionally
discriminatory treatment.”179 Judge Wood’s description of the elements
of a class of one claim makes no mention of improper motivation. She
did, however, make a concession in that direction as follows. Although
proof of illegitimate motive is not a primary element of the class of one
claim, it could be relevant as “illustrative of the kind of facts on which a
plaintiff might rely in a complaint to show that the lack of a rational basis
is not merely possible, but plausible.”180
In the end, the Seventh Circuit’s Del Marcelle opinion, which was supposed to introduce clarity into the class of one standard, instead left the
matter as confused as ever. The case was not an outright victory for Posner in that only three other judges agreed with his opinion that animus is
the essence of the class of one claim. But the case was still something of a
validation for Posner, in that nine out of ten circuit judges were of the
view that evidence of illegitimate motive was at least relevant in proving
a class of one claim. This is a surprising result in relation to the Supreme
Court’s Olech opinion, which had made clear that subjective ill will was
not a required element of the class of one claim. Posner had changed the
conversation and pushed it into the direction he favored.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 894.
at 895.
at 899.
at 900 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
at 913 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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In Scherr v. City of Chicago,181 the plaintiff complained of improper
police conduct that had adversely affected her. The trial judge rejected
her class of one claim. Although the plaintiff did not pursue it on appeal,
Posner was still willing to comment on the claim.182 He began, citing Del
Marcelle, by noting that “[t]he limits of the [class of one] doctrine are
unclear.”183 He then went on to cite his own Hilton opinion from 2000, in
which he had insisted that a necessary element of the class of one claim
was that the defendant sought to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection
“for reasons of a personal nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant’s position.”184 Under that standard, Posner suggested that the plaintiff may have stated a valid claim based on the defendant’s animus toward
the plaintiff.185 But Posner then went on to cite his later opinion in Lauth
v. McCollum, a case in which animus played a lesser role.186 Posner stated
that animus “comes into play only when, no rational reason or motive
being imaginable for the injurious action taken by the defendant against the
plaintiff, the action would be inexplicable unless animus had motivated
it,”187 and that a class of one plaintiff must, to prevail, “negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification.”188 In Scherr, there was a rational basis for the defendant’s action—probable cause for issue of a search warrant—and thus the
plaintiff’s class of one claim failed.189
Scherr is a good example of a case where the defendant has in fact
acted with animus, but would have acted, absent animus, in the same way
and had rational basis for that action. In such a case, animus alone is
insufficient to state a class of one claim. It also seems to be the case in
both Scherr and Lauth that Posner is willing to give more weight to irrationality as a relevant factor in class of one claims, although animus is still
for him a primary focus.
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF JUDGE POSNER’S
CLASS OF ONE VIEWS
To what extent have Judge Posner’s strongly articulated views on the
class of one claim influenced other courts, both within and without the
Seventh Circuit? It must initially be conceded that one cannot prove Posner’s influence on other courts, except in those cases where there is a
direct citation to a Posner class of one opinion. The eleven Posner opin181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

757 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 598 (dictum).
Id.
Id. (quoting Hilton v. City of Wheeler, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Id. (dictum).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Id. (plaintiff’s class of one claim was abandoned on appeal).
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ions discussed in this article have been cited by 1,219 other courts,190 and
that number itself suggests a substantial influence. But where other courts
have adopted an animus requirement for class of one claims, without citing Posner, it is likely that the judges writing those opinions were influenced by Posner, who was both the earliest and strongest advocate of
animus as an essential element of the class of one claim. This section suggests that Posner’s class of one viewpoint, voiced early and strongly, almost certainly influenced the debate, and that the proper measure of that
influence is the extent that other courts subsequently adopted the view he
argued for.
A. WITHIN

THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

In addition to the nine class of one cases in which Posner wrote the
majority opinion, four other Seventh Circuit cases decided after Hilton
adopted Posner’s view of class of one claims as requiring evidence of ill
will, hostility, vindictiveness, or animus.191 To be sure, not all of the Seventh Circuit panels insisted on showing animus. In Nevel v. Village of
Schaumburg,192 for example, a panel of the Seventh Circuit suggested
that a plaintiff had two options to prove a class of one claim.193 One of
those options, following Posner, was to prove illegitimate animus.194 The
other option tracked the language of the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion
much more closely: the plaintiffs could prevail if they could show that
they were “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”195 One
could view the Nevel standard as giving equal weight to the Supreme
Court and to Judge Posner. While the earlier cases had exalted Posner
over the Supreme Court, the Nevel panel treated him merely as an equal
to the Supreme Court.
Other Seventh Circuit panels followed Nevel, finding that a class of one
claim could be stated either by alleging improper animus or by alleging
190. A Westlaw search on Feb. 28, 2018, showed the following number of case citations
to Posner’s class of one opinions. See Scherr v. City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2014)
(13 citations); Del Marcelle v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2012) (141 citations); Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2005) (155 citations); Crowley v.
McKinney, 400 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2005) (51 citations); Tuffendsam v. Dearborn Cty. Bd. of
Health, 385 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2004) (36 citations); Indiana Land Co. v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2004) (52 citations); Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 712 (7th
Cir. 2004) (129 citations); Hilton v. City of Wheeler, 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000) (197
citations); Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998) (89 citations); Ind.
State Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 101 F.3d 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (48 citations);
Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995) (308 citations). This adds to a total of 1,219
citations.
191. See Fenje v. Feld, 398 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2005); Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 319 F.3d 277, 283 (7th Cir. 2003); Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002); Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579, 587 (7th Cir.
2001).
192. 297 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002).
193. Id. at 681 (citing Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2001)).
194. Id. (citing Albiero, 246 F.3d at 932).
195. Id. (quoting Albiero, 246 F.3d at 932).
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intentionally different treatment of similarly situated persons without any
rational basis for doing so.196 Although these cases do not adopt Posner’s
view that animus is an essential element of the class of one claim, they
show his influence in that proving animus is one of the ways a class of one
claim can succeed. And Posner’s influence can also be seen in the Circuit’s en banc decision in Del Marcelle.197 Although Posner’s understanding that improper motivation is an essential element of the class of one
claim was supported by only three other judges, five additional judges
affirmed that evidence of improper motivation was relevant to proving a
class of one claim.198 And all this after the Supreme Court in Olech had
stated that animus is not a necessary element of the class of one claim.
B. IN OTHER CIRCUITS
In other circuits, there is considerable support for Judge Posner’s version of the class of one claim. Panels from the First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits have all issued opinions stating that something in
the nature of ill will or vindictiveness is an essential element of a class of
one claim. In SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster,199 a panel of
the First Circuit stated that “[T]o establish its claim . . . [a plaintiff must]
allege facts indicating that, ‘compared with others similarly situated, [it]
was selectively treated . . . based on impermissible considerations such as
. . . malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.’”200 In Shipp v. McMahon,201 a panel of the Fifth Circuit cited Hilton favorably and noted
that that court had found that “an improper motive is critical and opined
that its absence will defeat an Equal Protection challenge to unequal police protection.”202 In Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens,203 a panel of the
Ninth Circuit, explaining the nature of the class of one claim, stated that
in such a case, the plaintiff “does not allege that the defendants discriminate against a group with whom she shares characteristics, but rather that
the defendants simply harbor animus against her in particular and therefore treated her arbitrarily.”204 In Mimics Inc. v. Village of Angel Fire,205
a panel of the Tenth Circuit stated that to succeed as a class of one claim,
196. See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1002 (7th Cir. 2006);
Lunini v. Grayeb, 395 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 2005); Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767,
775–76 (7th Cir. 2005); McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004);
Albiero, 246 F.3d at 932.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 157–177.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 157–177.
199. 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008).
200. Id. at 34 (second and third alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Barrington Cove Ltd. P’ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2001)).
201. 234 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 2002).
202. Shipp, 234 F.3d at 916 (citing Hilton v. City of Wheeler, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
203. 546 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2008).
204. Id. at 592 (emphasis added and omitted).
205. 394 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2005).
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the plaintiffs “must prove that they were ‘singled out for persecution due
to some animosity,’ meaning that the actions of [the defendant] were a
‘spiteful effort to “get” [the plaintiffs] for reasons wholly unrelated to any
legitimate state activity.’”206 In Williams v. Pryor,207 a panel of the Eleventh Circuit described the holding of the Supreme Court’s Olech opinion
as follows: “[the] plaintiff stated [a] constitutional Equal Protection
Clause cause of action by alleging that village acted irrationally, wholly
arbitrarily, and out of malice toward [the] plaintiff.”208 There is some authority to the contrary in these circuits.209
In two circuits (Second and Sixth), there is authority that, although animus is not an essential element of a class of one claim, it is one of the
methods of proving such a case. In the Second Circuit, while there is
some confusion and inconsistent authority, there is at least some support
for the view that proof of animus is one of the methods that can be used.
In DeMuria v. Hawkes,210 a panel of the Second Circuit, interpreting
Olech, stated that “the allegation of an impermissible motive and of animus is sufficient to establish an equal protection issue.”211 The DeMuria
court then cited Harlen Assocsiates Inc. v. Village of Mineola,212 an earlier Second Circuit precedent, as “holding that a plaintiff must show either lack of rational basis or animus under Olech.”213 A panel of the Sixth
Circuit, in Warren v. City of Athens,214 stated that “A ‘class of one’ plaintiff may demonstrate that a government action lacks a rational basis in
one of two ways: either by ‘negativ[ing] every conceivable basis which
might support’ the government action or by demonstrating that the challenged government action was motivated by animus or ill-will.”215
On the other hand, other circuits have rejected Posner’s focus on animus, either by specifically rejecting animus as a requirement—
“[a]lthough [the plaintiff] must show that the [defendant’s] decision was
206. Id. at 849 (quoting Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Sch., 263 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir.
2001)).
207. 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
208. Id. at 951 (emphasis added) (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562
(2000) (per curiam)).
209. See, e.g., Gerhart v. Lake County, 637 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011); Cordi-Allen
v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 250 n.3 (1st Cir. 2007); Stotter v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 508
F.3d 812, 824 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007); Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County, 440 F.3d
1202, 1210 (10th Cir. 2006); Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir.
2007).
210. 328 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2003).
211. Id. at 707.
212. 273 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 2001).
213. Id. at 500. But see Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 140 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“We have held that to succeed on a class of one claim, a plaintiff must establish
that: ‘(i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from
those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on the basis
of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances and difference in
treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendants acted on the basis of
a mistake.’”) (citation omitted).
214. 411 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2005).
215. Id. at 711 (alterations in original) (quoting Klimik v. Kent Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 91
F. App’x 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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intentional, he need not show that the Commissioners were motivated by
subjective ill will;216 or by simply repeating the Olech formula—where
plaintiff must allege that “she has been intentionally treated differently
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment,”217 and thus by implication omitting any animus
requirement.
In sum, while there is disagreement within the circuits as to the meaning of Olech, Judge Posner’s view that animus is either required or relevant has support in eight circuits. In view of the fact that the Supreme
Court in Olech ignored animus, this is a significant influence.
V. WHO WAS RIGHT?
In addition to the question of who had more influence—the Supreme
Court or Judge Posner—there is a second, related question—who was
right? Should the class of one claim be based on irrationality or animus?
If that question were to be answered, first, on the basis of equal protection precedents, or second, on the basis of pragmatism rather than judicial hierarchy, then the answer would be clear: Judge Posner is right and
the United States Supreme Court is wrong.
As a matter of precedent, a focus on animus is consistent both with the
purpose behind the Equal Protection Clause and many of the Court’s
precedents interpreting it. In one of its first cases interpreting the recently
adopted Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court made clear that the
“one pervading purpose” of that clause was the protection of newly freed
slaves from oppression by those who had formerly exercised control over
them.218 Judge Posner’s updated version of that assertion is that the purpose behind the Equal Protection Clause is “to protect the vulnerable.”219 When animus is a required element of the class of one claim, then
courts are able to focus on “vicious or exploitative” treatment of an individual—“[i]ndeed a lone victim picked out for social or economic oppression or extinction can be especially vulnerable.”220
The general standard for rational basis review is that a classification
needs to be rationally related to a permissible purpose.221 In theory, this
standard can be violated either by a showing of irrationality—the classification is not rationally related to a permissible purpose222—or by a showing of animus—the classification is designed to achieve an impermissible
216. Gerhart v. Lake County, 637 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011).
217. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)).
218. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879).
219. Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2004).
220. Id.
221. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
222. E.g., Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 24 (1985) (regarding the purpose of having
those who use the roads pay for them, “[t]he distinction between [resident and nonresident] bears no relation to the statutory purpose.”).
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purpose, such as desire to harm a particular group.223 While the Supreme
Court very occasionally invalidates classifications on the grounds of irrationality, in recent years most successful rational basis claims that succeed
do so because the Court finds animus.
Probably the four most famous of these heightened rationality cases
are United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,224 City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,225 Romer v. Evan,226 and United
States v. Windsor.227 In all of these cases, the Court invalidated government action because it was based on improper animus. In Moreno, a food
stamp case, the Court held that a mere desire to harm a politically unpopular group was not a permissible government interest.228 In Cleburne, the
Court invalidated a local land use decision because it was motivated by
an “irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.”229 In Romer, the
Court invalidated a state constitutional provision because it was “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”230 and because it raised “the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”231 In Windsor,
the Court invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act because “[t]he
avowed purpose and practical effect of the law . . . [was] to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter[ed]
into same-sex marriages.”232 Thus, a focus on improper motivation has
long been one of the tools in the equal protection toolbox, and would
have been an appropriate limiting principle for the Supreme Court to
have used in the class of one area.
In the spring of 2018, the Supreme Court decided two First Amendment cases233 that demonstrated both the strength of the animus argument as well as its limitations. In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission,234 the Court upheld the First Amendment claim of a
baker who was unwilling to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple,
because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage. The Court could
have treated the case as the starting point of a discussion that balanced
the baker’s freedom of religion claim against the weight of the state’s
interest in prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Instead, the Court decided the case on the much narrower ground of ani223. E.g., Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (“[A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”).
224. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
225. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
226. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
227. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
228. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
229. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
230. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
231. Id. at 634.
232. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770.
233. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
234. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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mus or hostility to religion.235
It turned out to be important to the Court that, when the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission was considering the discrimination claim against
the baker, one of the commissioners stated that there were “hundreds of
situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that
people can use—to use their religion to hurt others.”236 The Court said of
this statement that “[t]o describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that a man can use’ is to disparage his religion,”237 and this conduct “violated the State’s duty under the First
Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or a
religious viewpoint.”238
The Cakeshop opinion appeared to be a full-throated validation of the
importance of animus in constitutional adjudication, suggesting that evidence of animus or hostility outweighs all other considerations. The
Court, for example, gave no weight to the fact that the Commission had a
very plausible and defensible reason for its decision—giving effect to the
Colorado’s state anti-discrimination law. Nor did the Court seem to consider that the Commissioner’s claim had a factual underpinning, that is,
religion has in fact been used to justify discrimination, even in arguments
made in cases that reached the Supreme Court.239 Had the Cakeshop
opinion been the Court’s final pronouncement on the subject, then one
could say that evidence of animus is likely to carry the day in a constitutional argument.
Just three weeks later, however, in Trump v. Hawaii,240 the Court was
faced with a case in which there was substantial evidence of animus, but
the Court chose to treat that evidence as irrelevant. The case involved,
inter alia, a First Amendment challenge to President Trump’s proclamation that imposed entry restrictions on immigrants from certain predominantly Muslim countries.241 The plaintiffs alleged that the primary
purpose of the proclamation was religious animus, and that the national
security concerns used to justify it were mere pretext.242 Justice
Sotomayor, in her dissenting opinion, noted that there was substantial
evidence that anti-Muslim animus was in fact the basis for the proclama235. Id. at 1731–32.
236. Id. at 1729.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1731.
239. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (“Almighty God created the races
white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but
for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The
fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.”) (statement of trial judge); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(“The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.”) (justifying the exclusion of women
from the practice of law).
240. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
241. Id. at 2403.
242. Id. at 2417.
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tion.243 The majority, however, adopting a rational basis standard in this
First Amendment case,244 stated that it would uphold the policy if it was
“plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the
country and improve vetting processes.”245 Applying this standard very
generously, the Court stated that “because there is persuasive evidence
that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security
concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility, we must accept that
independent justification.”246 The Court effectively stated that, when
there is a plausible justification for government action, it will not look
behind that action for evidence of animus. But, of course, that was not
the standard the Court adopted in its Cakeshop opinion.
Even after Trump v. Hawaii, there is still substantial support in Supreme Court precedent for the relevance of animus in constitutional adjudication, but it must be admitted that those precedents are not followed
consistently. And there is also increasing focus on animus in the scholarly
literature of rational-basis review, outside of the class of one context. Susannah W. Pollvogt, in Unconstitutional Animus,247 identifies “animus” as
constituting the most coherent explanation of what is not a permissible
purpose under the Equal Protection Clause. She says:
[A]nimus, including hostility toward a particular social group, is
never a valid basis for legislation or other state action248 . . . . So
while the Court has discerned the presence of unconstitutional animus on only a few occasions, when animus is found, it functions as a
doctrinal silver bullet249 . . . [D]emonstrating that a law is based on
unconstitutional animus is virtually the only way a plaintiff is successful under deferential rational basis review.250
Dale Carpenter, in Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus,251 argues that “the concept of animus has emerged from equal protection doctrine as an “independent constitutional force.”252 He states:
[C]onsider the simple idea that it is wrong for one person to treat
another person malevolently. This sentiment so suffuses our moral
243. Id. at 2438–39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Taking all the relevant evidence together, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was driven primarily
by anti-Muslim animus, rather than by the Government’s asserted national-security justifications. Even before being sworn into office, then-candidate Trump stated that ‘Islam hates
us,’ warned that ‘[w]e’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having problems
with Muslims coming into the country,’ promised to enact a ‘total and complete shutdown
of Muslims entering the United States,’ . . . and instructed one of his advisers to find a
‘lega[l]’ way to enact a Muslim ban. The President continued to make similar statements
well after his inauguration, as detailed above.”) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
244. Id. at 2420 (majority opinion).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2421.
247. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
248. Id. at 888.
249. Id. at 889.
250. Id. at 892.
251. Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT.
REV. 183 (2014).
252. Id.
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and legal tradition that hardly anyone would deny it. “Of course it is
our moral heritage that one should not hate any human being or
class of human beings,” wrote Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissent in
Romer v Evans. Animus doctrine constitutionalizes this basic precept. It asserts that just as individuals have a moral and sometimes
legal duty not to act maliciously toward others, the group of people
elected as representatives (or acting in some other official governmental capacity) in a liberal democracy has a moral and sometimes
constitutional duty not to act maliciously toward a person or group
of people.253
Andrew Koppelman, in Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare
Desire to Harm,”254 explains that the constitutional problem with DOMA
was that “a group [was] deliberately singled out for broad harm for the
sake of an insignificant benefit. Singled out: this is not a matter of unintended impact.”255 “DOMA’s purpose was to convey a message of disdain for gay couples, with extreme indifference to the human costs.”256
The “singling out” that Koppelman describes is exactly what Posner is
focusing on when he identifies animus as the essential element in the class
of one claim.
William Araiza has recently published a book-length treatment on the
subject, Animus, A Short Introduction to Bias in the Law,257 in which he
asserts that “[a]nimus matters more than ever today.”258 Araiza has also
focused on animus specifically in the class of one context. In Irrationality
and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases,259 argues that “direct evidence of animus [is] a necessary and appropriate part of the plaintiff’s [class of one] case.”260 Reviewing the Moreno, Cleburne, Romer line
of cases, Araiza notes that “animus . . . constitutes one of the core
prohibitions of the Equal Protection Clause.”261 Although animus and
irrationality are generally considered to be alternative methods for proving equal protection violations, the irrationality standard tends to not
work at all in the class of one context, since there are typically “a nearly
limitless number of hypothetical justifications for the challenged decision
and a large number of potentially relevant factual bases.”262 As a result,
“it becomes nearly impossible for a court not to be able to find a hypo253. Id. at 185, 185 n.6 (footnotes omitted) (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 157 (Harvard, 1980) (“To disadvantage a
group essentially out of dislike is surely to deny its members equal concern and respect,
specifically by valuing their welfare negatively.”)).
254. Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to
Harm,” 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1045 (2014).
255. Id. at 1068.
256. Id. at 1069.
257. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW
(2017).
258. Id. at 3.
259. William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection
Cases, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493 (2007).
260. Id. at 501.
261. Id. at 502.
262. Id. at 507.
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thetical justification supported by at least some rationally findable
facts.”263 In this situation, then, direct proof of animus is the only workable alternative.264
Darien Shanske adopts the opposing view in Engquist and the Erosion
of the Equal Protection Clause: An Attempt to Stop the Creep of Irrational
Dicta.265 In that article he rejects animus as an essential element of class
of one claims: “Neither at the level of theory nor practice must malice be
demonstrated in a class of one case.”266 Shanske argues that pure irrationality, without evidence of animus, should be sufficient to state a class
of one claim, and that public officials face a “‘reason-giving’ requirement,”267 that is, they must be able to give a reason that serves as an
adequate explanation for their actions. But even after rejecting the necessity of animus, Shanske then suggests that the standard he would adopt to
prove irrationality is the one proposed by Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth
Circuit:
The plaintiff can show that no rational basis exists in a class of one
case by showing that an “asserted rational basis was merely a pretext
for different treatment.” Such pretext may be shown by demonstrating “either: (1) the proffered rational basis was objectively false; or
(2) the defendant actually acted based on an improper motive.” As
to the second prong, reasons that are “malicious, irrational or plainly
arbitrary” cannot provide a rational basis. Thus, malice can in some
circumstances serve as a basis for showing both disparate treatment
and lack of rational basis.268
Thus, for Shanske, animus is not essential, but it is clearly relevant and
will often be the measure of proof that demonstrates the irrationality that
he demands as the proper test. And, if Araiza is correct, evidence of animus will be necessary in most cases since, without it, prohibited irrationality directed at a particular individual will be impossible to be prove.
Moving on to pragmatism, the Supreme Court’s Olech decision has
very much the feel of a head-in-the-clouds decision, one that is oblivious
to the everyday realities of government workers. Does it make sense to
announce a constitutional rule that immediately turns tens of thousands
of actions by individual government workers into unconstitutional acts?
This is the problem that Posner identifies: it is inevitable that local government officials, when enforcing rules or making other decisions, will
not be able to treat all similarly-situated persons similarly.
The fact that the local police cannot pull over every driver who is
speeding should not mean that they cannot pull over any driver at all. The
263. Id.
264. Id. at 508.
265. Darien Shanske, Engquist and the Erosion of the Equal Protection Clause: An Attempt to Stop the Creep of Irrational Dicta, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (2010).
266. Id. at 987.
267. Id. at 990.
268. Id. at 991 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1013–14 (9th Cir.
2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
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fact that the prosecutor’s office cannot investigate and bring charges in
every case of wrongdoing brought to their attention should not mean that
it cannot prosecute anyone. The fact that there are five virtually indistinguishable towing companies applying for the one towing contract should
not mean that the towing contract cannot be entered into at all. In all of
these cases, and many more like them, it is inevitable that similarly situated persons will be treated differently. They ought not to have a constitutional claim. Government cannot operate if they all do. “The
Constitution does not require states to enforce their laws (or cities their
ordinances) with Prussian thoroughness as the price of being allowed to
enforce them at all.”269 A requirement of animus by government officials
to establish a class of one claim reduces the “[b]reathtaking vistas of liability”270 to a manageable size.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States court system is hierarchical. The district courts must
follow the courts of appeal and the courts of appeal must follow the Supreme Court. It is said that the United States Supreme Court has the final
word on the meaning of our Constitution—the Court is correct because it
is final.271 But that explanation of the relationship between lower courts
and the Supreme Court is perhaps an oversimplification. When Justice
Breyer was asked about the meaning of a recent Court decision in which
he had authored one of the opinions, he replied, “It depends on what the
lower courts make of it.”272
When Judge Posner was writing his Hilton opinion, less than two
months after the Supreme Court had published Olech and before any
other federal circuit court had cited it, he had a choice to make. Either
follow a Supreme Court opinion that appeared to be ill-considered and
problematic, or construe that opinion in a way that he considered to be
more sensible and more consistent with underlying constitutional precedent. Posner, of course, chose the latter option. He wrote an opinion that
purported to follow the Supreme Court but, in substance affirmed his
own Seventh Circuit Olech opinion. Judge Posner’s stature within the judicial community was sufficiently prominent and his powers of persuasion
sufficiently compelling that his views commanded substantial support. He
could not overrule the Supreme Court, but he succeeded in neutralizing it
to a substantial degree. Posner said that he feared that his advocacy of
animus as the core of the class of one claim was a doomed rearguard
action. No more doomed than the action of King Leonidas and the three
hundred Spartans at Thermopylae.
269. Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1985) (opinion by Posner, J.).
270. Tuffendsam v. Dearborn Cty. Bd. of Health, 385 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 2004).
271. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
272. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court and the Law of Motion, N.Y. TIMES (July
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/7/20/opinion/the-supreme-court-and-the-law-ofmotion.html.
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